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The instability in the Southern Border Provinces of Thailand resurged on January 
4, 2004. The current conflict is more complicated because the government, the 
insurgency and the population all need to be recognized as players.  Of these, the 
population is the most important actor, especially its interaction with the international 
community, as stated in the Dr. Gordon McCormick’s Counterinsurgency Model. The 
state and the counter-state are trying to use their own strategies to gain advantages in 
controlling the people and gaining international support, while simultaneously blocking 
the other side from doing so. According to Arreguin-Toft’s study, the state will win the 
war if it utilizes the same approach as the counter-state.  The asymmetric warfare model 
of Arreguin-Toft applies well to this case since the use of direct strategy and strong force 
are not always the right approaches in every battle.  Additionally, the forms of insurgency 
in the south of Thailand have changed from guerrilla warfare and indoctrination into the 
insurgents’ ideology as a tool to draw support from people into, instead, the use of 
violence in the form of terrorism.  Because of these changes, the definition of 
“insurgency” in the south of Thailand needs to be redefined.  
This thesis advocates the following. With regards to the people and the 
international communities, the Thai government should use only the indirect approach. 
The indirect approach is preferred when the insurgency controls the majority of people.  
The direct approach should be used only when majority of the people support the 
government and, apparently, have isolated themselves from the insurgency.  
The final goal of this study is to provide a reference for comparison and 
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The insurgency in the southern provinces of Thailand has been resurging since 
January 4, 2004. The number of violent incidents, including deaths and casualties, 
attributed to the insurgency has increased during these four years and  continues grow 
daily. Until recently, no one has officially claimed responsibility for these incidents. Thai 
government has tried to use both the direct and indirect approaches, which will be 
discussed later in this thesis, to deal with the situation and especially to reduce the 
vilolent incidents created by the insurgents. The government needs to restore the south of 
Thailand back to a position of peace as soon as possible by answering the following 
questions: which strategy is to be focused on, the direct or indirect approaches, or both; 
why do the insurgents who are Muslims use violence against Muslims themselves; and 
how can the Thai government put an end to the violence created by the insurgents in the 
southern part of Thailand? 
The unrest in the south of Thailand involves many factors. However, the 
important factors that constitute the root causes of the current crisis are the following.  
First, there are the ethno-religious, cultural, and lingual differences of the people in the 
southern provinces and other parts of Thailand. Second, it is a fact that the southern 
region remains behind in terms of development, which ultimately has led to poverty and a 
low quality of life for the residents of that area. In addition, the people are also suffering 
from the injustice and malfunction of the central government. Third, the resistance that 
has emerged since Thailand annexed the province of Pattani more than 200 years ago. It 
is believed that there are differences in the objectives for the rebels or insurgents and the 
people in the south of Thailand. The rebels want to liberate the south from the central 
government and form a new country. But the people of the south just want the central 
government to recognize and accept the above differences between them and the people 
in the other parts of the country. If the above differences are recognized and accepted, the 
people in the south likely will be treated indiscriminately and equally by the central 
 2
government in relation to people in the other parts of the country. This, hopefully, will 
lead to justice and development in the south. 
1. Purpose 
The instability in the south of Thailand has become part of the national agenda. 
The purpose of this thesis is to study and make recommendations for the appropriate 
strategy needed to put an end to the violence. This author also expects to assess and 
evaluate the quality of the current government campaigns, and also try to come up with 
the real improvements needed for government campaigns in order to restore the three 
provinces back to a collective peaceful environment very soon. Moreover, this study 
hopes to serve as a reference for the comparison and application of other cases of 
counterinsurgency that are going on in the world today. 
2. Structure of Analysis 
This study is a qualitative research project utilizing some descriptive quantitative 
data from secondary sources to focus on analysis and measurement of the success or 
failure of the strategies of the state against the counter-state and population. The thesis is 
based on open sources and the reviews useful models and case studies such as Dr. 
Gordon McCormick’s Mystic Diamond, Arreguin-Toft’s Model, as well as the success of 
counterinsurgency campaigns against the communists in Malaya and Thailand, the 
Philippines counterinsurgency, and the Aceh Conflict. A comparison or contrast of each 
model and case is made in order to find out the most suitable answer to this study. 
This thesis further indicates that the state and the counter-state are trying to use 
their own strategies to gain advantages in controlling the people and gaining international 
support, while simultaneously blocking the other side from doing so. Based on Arreguin-
Toft’s study, the state will win the war if it utilizes the same approach as the counter-
state.   
As a consequence, the best advice for the Thai government is to use only an 
indirect approach for the people and the international community at any time. The 
indirect approach should also be used when the insurgency controls most of the people. 
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The only proper time to apply a direct approach is when most of the people support the 
government and have apparently separated themselves from the insurgency.  
3. Plan for the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into five chapters and one appendix.  Chapter I is comprised 
of two parts. The first provides an introduction to the case.  The research question of how 
the government can best put an end to the violence by choosing between the direct and 
indirect approaches is discussed, with the purpose of this thesis being to find the answer 
to that question.  The methodology of this thesis is mainly qualitative with some 
descriptive quantitative research.  Next, in the second part, the history of Thailand from 
the kingdom of absolute monarchy in the 13th century to the democracy today is 
provided.  The background of the kingdom of Pattani and the three provinces, as well as 
the five insurgency groups in Thailand from the mid 20th century, which have the same 
main objective but differ in details and tactics, is discussed. Finally, the major incidents 
in the south that emphasize the failure of the assimilation policy and the use of the hot-
hand of the government in the Kru Sae and Tak Bai incidents are presented, including the 
daily incidents, insurgent tactics, and the types of victims, most of whom are civilians, 
both Buddhists and Muslims. 
Chapter II examines the privileged policy for Muslims after the unsuccessful 
attempt to unite the Muslims to the Thai identity. After that, the study places emphasis on 
the failure of the aggressive policies of the Thaksin government before September 2006 
that worsened the disequilibrium, and the mix of direct and indirect strategies of the 
Juranont regime after September 2006, such as the implementation of information 
operations, more development projects, and the justice campaign, as well as the use of 
force in June 2007 that was, perhaps, considered a better application. Nonetheless, after 
the offensive operation, the incidents of violence have been decreasing in quantity, but 
the number of deaths and casualties continues to fluctuate.  
Chapter III reviews the applicable theories and models from scholars, such as 
McCormick’s Mystic Diamond that implies the interaction among state, counter-state, 
people and international actors; and Arreguin-Toft’s Model that suggests the strong will 
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lose to the weak if the wrong strategy is applied. Bale clarifies the definition of terrorism, 
its victims and the need for media attention by terrorists. Finally, the comparison of the 
models and the definitions are provided. 
Chapter IV shows the successes and failures of the similar selected cases, relative 
to the south of Thailand, by following the success of the counterinsurgency campaign 
against the communists in Malaya and Thailand, the Philippines counterinsurgency, and 
the Aceh Conflict. In each case the counterinsurgency models, including the case in the 
south of Thailand, are explained. The chapter concludes with applied scenarios from the 
models and cases for the state strategies. 
Chapter V provides the author’s conclusions and suggestions from the study that 
the state needs to apply the strategies suggested by the Mystic Diamond and utilize the 
same approach as the counter-state according to Arreguin-Toft’s Model to end the unrest.  
Appendix section A demonstrates the history of conflictions sequenced by years 
that led to the emergence of the counter-state. From secondary sources, Appendix section 
B illustrates the total number of incidents, the deaths and casualties in the south of 
Thailand annually from January 2004 to July 2009.  From these illustrations, readers will 
find that after implementing the new strategies initiated by Prime Minister Julanont after 
the 2006 coup, the number of violent incidents have  declined, but not the number of 
deaths and injuries. A breakdown of the kinds of victims from January 2004 to July 2009, 
most of whom are soft targets, is provided. Lastly, the comparison between Buddhist and 
Muslim victims from January 2004 to July 2009 illustrates the gender, age and religion of 
the victims, with the implication that there is no significant difference between Muslim 
and Buddhist victims after the offensive operation.  
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1. The Kingdom of Thailand 
The kingdom of Thailand, or Siam, is a country with a Constitutional Monarchy, 
located in southeast Asia, with an area of 513,000 square kilometers, and composed of 76 
provinces and 62 million people (Minister of Interior: Department of Demography, 
2009). The kingdom of Thailand was established in the 13th century with the first capital 
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city bearing the name Sukhothai. In the 15th century, the capital city was moved to 
Ayuthaya.  During the last two centuries, the capital city of Thailand was finally moved 
and named Bangkok and is located in the central part of Thailand. King Rama IX is the 
beloved present king of all the Thai people. Following its establishment, the kingdom of 
Thailand has experienced a long history of fighting and domination over its neighboring 
countries. For the time being, Thailand is very peaceful with only some small conflicts 
along the boundaries with its neighbors such as Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. 
However, Thailand and its neighboring states have a collaborated committee to work on 
these problems. Moreover, in 1980, shortly before the end of Cold War, Thailand 
successfully used Reconciliation and Amnesty Programs to overcome the Thai 
Communism Party, which had tried to change the democratic regime to a communist 
administration (Storey, 2007). After the world turned toward a period of U.S. hegemony, 
Thailand and most of the ASEAN members chose to support the United States in the War 
on Terror after 9/11. Simultaneously, one additional threat to Thailand began with the 
insurgency in the three southernmost provinces along the border (Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat). These provinces historically have suffered from the annexation by Siam 
more than 200 years ago, and they showed indications of wanting to fight the government 
again.  Then unpredicted unrest occurred on January, 4, 2004, and the insurgents declared 
war on the government by attacking a battalion in the Narathiwat province. After that, a 
number of violent incidents including bombings, shootings, and arsons have taken place 
daily. 
More than 2,500–3,000 years into its history, Thailand and the Indo-China region 
were influenced by Brahmanism (Hinduism) and Buddhism from India, respectively. In 
the 7th–8th and 13th–14th centuries, before and after the Crusade War, Islam was 
brought to Southeast Asia and the south of Thailand. Nevertheless, Buddhism is the most 
widely held belief among the Thai people. Today, approximately 95 percent of Thai 
people believe in Buddhism, 4.5 percent believe in Islam, and 0.5 percent believes in 
other religions (Ampunan, 2007, p. 1). Currently 99 percent of Thai Muslims are Sunni 
and only one percent are Shia (Mahidol University, 2009). Eighty percent (2.3 million) of 
the Muslims in Thailand live in the three southernmost provinces, including the western 
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part of the Songkla province, the Satun province (Ampunan, 2007, p. 1). The southern 
border provinces of Thailand are shown in Figure 1.  Not only are there differences in 
religion between the people of the three provinces and the rest of Thailand, but also in the 
background, ethnicity, culture, and the language (Jawi), differences which are actually 
more similar to the Malays than the Thais (Maisonti, 2004, p. 6). 
 
 
Figure 1.   The Southern Border Provinces of Thailand  
(From “Southern Thailand,” 2009) 
2. The Chaos of the Former Kingdom of Pattani and the Present 
Southern Border Provinces of Thailand 
The kingdom of Pattani experienced a long, independent history before its 
annexation to Thailand from the 7th to 18th century. The empire was a great region of 
seaports, fisheries and agriculture. First, the kingdom was influenced by Hinduism and 
Buddhism from India, beginning in the 7th century; then Islam was brought to the area 
and to other countries in Southeast Asia in the 13th–14th centuries. During that time, 
Pattani was invaded and colonized by the kingdom of Siam as Siam was rising to power, 
and it was released when Siam began to fall. After that, conflict in the area has re-
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emerged over time. In the middle of the 20th century, a crisis exploded again when the 
king of Pattani, or “Sulatan,” was demoted to a normal citizen and the Assimilation 
Policy was enacted. Consequently, a written document was sent to the Thai government 
requesting recognition of the identity of the southern people, but the request encountered 
a negative response. Subsequently, many groups advocating resistance activities were 
established. Their tactics have evolved from those of guerrilla warfare into the well-
known incidents of terrorism today. The details of the chronological events of Pattani are 
outlined in Appendix section A.  
3. Insurgency Groups in Thailand  
As mentioned above, the former Kingdom of Pattani was annexed to the southern 
border provinces of Thailand, which brought repression and fostered grievances among 
some of the elites of the former kingdom. Since then, a number of small resistance groups 
have formed among the people of the former Pattani. However, after the 1949 incident, 
the arrest of a Muslim leader (Appendix section A), the resistance of those small groups 
became very intense. Their common objective has remained an independent state, even 
though their approaches to gain that independence might be different. By 1980–1990, the 
groups were applying guerrilla warfare but encountered hard suppression from the Thai 
government that coordinated with the government of Malaysia. Secretly, many groups 
were subsequently reestablished, and on January 4, 2004, the day of the declaration of 
war on the government, the violence escalated and has continued to the present. Some 
factions disagree with targeting innocents and Muslims, but the brutality is far from 
receding. Many extremists misperceive that violence is only way to fight the invader, the 
Thais. However, it is estimated that the insurgents have 3,000 militants and 6,000 main 
supporters in the southern provinces now (“Daily News,” 2009). Moreover, most of the 
groups have also set up an office in third countries, especially in Europe and in the north 
of Africa. Apart from that, they have sent their students and militants to study Islamic 
principles and terrorism tactics in Islamic countries including Malaysia and Indonesia. 
The insurgent groups in southern Thailand are discussed in the following paragraphs in 
chronological order.    
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a. Barisan Nasional Pemberbasan Pattani (BNPP) 
In 1959, the Barisan Nasional Pemberbasan Pattani, or Patani National 
Liberation Front (BNPP), was set up by Abdul Yhalal Nasare (Klaimanee, 2008, pp. 18–
24). The aim of this group was to fight for independence from Thailand. Many Islamic 
students were recruited into the religious schools. New recruiters were trained in the 
jungles and later sent to Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan for further training. The group 
increased its strength and was supported by the Parti Islam from Malaysia until 1978 
(Klaimanee, 2008, pp. 18–24). Notably, it seems like the movement of the group is rarely 
found in a report today. 
b. Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) 
On March 13, 1960, the group was founded by various Islamic teachers 
including Abdul Karim bin Hasan, Haji Harun Sulong, and Amin Tohmeena at the 
Dhamma Wittaya School in Yala province (Klaimanee, 2008, pp. 18–24). Many years 
later, this school served as the main location for conducting the group’s activities, 
training, and meetings.  It was recently estimated that the BRN is the core group of the 
insurgency in the southern part of Thailand. The goal of the movement is the same as that 
of the BNPP, but they currently do not agree on who the leaders will be after they win the 
war. Furthermore, the group retains strong ties with the Communist Party of Malaya 
(CPM) and the Pan Islamic State in Southeast Asia (Maisonti, 2004, pp. 10–14). At the 
time of its establishment, some leaders of the group wanted to fight by using political 
means, but later the group activities trended toward terrorism. Nonetheless, the BRN has 
been subsidized by Malaysia and the Middle East for its resources, training, activities, 
and meeting facilities. In 1977, the group was divided into the BRN-Congress (armed 
efforts), the BRN-Coordinate (political efforts), and in 1984, the BRN-Ulama, which 
focuses on religious rituals, was formed (Ampunan, 2007, pp. 9–13). In 2006, the 
government found a written document depicting the seven steps of revolution planned by 
Masae Usang, one of the BRN leaders. The details of these steps are the followings.  
1. Creating public awareness of Islam (religion), Malay (nationality) and 
Patani homeland, invasion/occupation [by the Thai state] and the struggle 
for independence; 2. Creating mass support through religious teaching (at 
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various levels, including tadika, ponoh, private Islamic colleges, and 
provincial Islamic committees) 3. Setting up a secretive organizational 
structure; 4.Recruiting and training (ethnic Malay Muslim) youth to 
become militants, aiming to have 3,000-strong well trained and well 
disciplined troops; 5. Building nationalist and independence struggle 
ideology among government officials (of ethnic Malay Muslim origin) and 
ethnic Malay Muslims (of the southern border provinces) who went to 
work in Malaysia; 6.Launching a new wave of attacks; 7. Declaring a 
revolution [Chalk, Rabasa, Rosenau & Piggott (2009, p. 20) quoted from 
Human Rights Watch (2007)].  
c. Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) 
On January 22, 1968, the PULO was organized by Kabir Abdul Rahman, 
who graduated with a degree in political science from India (Klaimanee, 2008, pp. 18–
19). The group was very effective during the period from 1970–1980 with strong support 
from Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Middle East. The objective of the group was to create 
an independent state by the reestablishment of five provinces including Pattani, Yala, 
Narathiwat, Satun, and some border districts of Songkha province. The leaders of the 
group were ancestrally related to an elite people from the area’s past. Primarily, the group 
was looking to fight for recognition of their ethnicity, but later they also claimed the 
Quran as their guide and sent students to Libya, Syria, Palestine, and the Middle East. 
The militants were trained not only by the countries that supported them, but also in the 
Budo Mountain and the north of Malaysia. In 1980, the group was also reformed into the 
New PULO. In 1988, the group split into the PULO-88 (Ampunan, 2007, p. 11). In 1998, 
the Thai government cooperated with the government of Malaysia to capture many 
leaders of the PULO. Although the group is not very powerful these days, speakers in 
Sweden and the north of Africa are interviewed by the western media quite often 
regarding the crises of southern Thailand. In addition, the PULO is infamous for its 
propaganda on the internet by creating many websites that attempt to discredit the 
government and promote the historical perception of the insurgents as freedom 
combatants, who later embraced the Muslim Jihad. In fact, many leaders of PULO 
disagree with the recent violent tactics on the ground; a senior PULO member was 
interviewed by Chalk, Rabasa, Rosenau, and  Piggott, (2009, p. 22). He stated that: 
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I fought for years in the jungle against the Thai state. I am still very much 
a [an ethnic Malay Muslim] nationalist and still dream of a free Patani 
Darulsalam. I will never hesitate to take up arms to fight again. But not 
like this, not the way this generation is conducting it. It seems like they are 
just killing for killing’s sake—creating fear to increase their power and 
control our people 
I don’t understand the insurgents. They are killing fellow Muslims, 
women, and children. I don’t understand what they are up to. Much of the 
conflict continues to be driven by resentment at the abuse and power of 
the [Thai] state. But you can’t just rise up and hit anybody. Whoever the 
insurgents see first, they attack. They engage in violence for the sake of 
violence.  
d. Gerakan Mujahideen Patani (GMP) and Gerakan Mujahideen 
Islam Patani (GMIP) 
On September 16, 1985, lead members of BNPP/BIPP, BRN-Coordinate, 
BRN-Ulama, and PULO met together and discussed their disunity. After that, the BBMP 
(Barisan Bersatu Mujahidin Patani) was formed as a coordinated operation center. 
However, the cooperation did not work well. Then, in 1986, the GMP (Gerakan 
Mujahideen Patani), a splinter group from BBMP was founded (Klaimanee, 2008, p. 22). 
The GMP conducted its activities in northern Malaysia with emphasis on political efforts. 
Subsequently, in 1995, the group broke away and became the GMIP with the shared 
aspiration of the Independent Islamic State, while expanding cooperation with the 
regional Islamic groups such as the KMM (Kampulan Mujahideen Malaysia), the ASG 
(Abu Sayyaf), and JI (Jemmah Islamihya). The GMIP specialized in urban bombing, 
using improvised explosive devices (IED) and raids by small groups of gunmen 
(Ampunan, 2007, p. 13). 
e. The United Front for the Independence of Patani (BERSATU) 
On August 31, 1989, the leaders of BIPP, BRN, GMP, and PULO came 
together again in order to tighten their cooperation, strengthen their capabilities, step 
forward in the same direction, and facilitate the receiving of international financial 
support. BERSATU means “together” in the Malaysian/Indonesian language. The goal of 
BERSATU is to fight for independence and act against the government of Thailand and 
its policies. The group calls for help from other Islamic groups and Muslim countries. 
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The BERSATU often holds meetings in Malaysia, led by the co-leader, Dr. Wan Kadir 
Che Man (Dr. Fadeh). However, there is no centralized controlling effort by him to unite 
activities. The groups’ members still carry out their operations freely, but with increased 
coordination (Klaimanee, 2008, pp. 18–24). 
4. Major Incidents and “Daily Incidents” in the South  
From January 4, 2004 to June 2008, there were more than 8,171 insurgency-
related incidents, 3,071 deaths and 4,986 injuries (Violence-related Injury Surveillance, 
2009). To date, the impetus to cease the violence is rarely found. As a matter of fact, the 
major events by which the government has had to bitterly learn the failures of its weak 
counter measure, and that such merciless responses could drive people to cooperate with 
the insurgency, are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
a. The Declaration of War on January 4, 2004 
After the Dusun Nyiur Incident in 1948 (Appendix section A), the 
southern Muslims experienced even more repression and grievances. There were many 
minor incidents and movements such as police checkpoint attacks, a small number of 
mass protests, trainings in the mountain areas, and school arsons, but the government 
underestimated the situation and did not prepare for the unpredicted disaster. As a matter 
of fact, at dawn of January 4, 2004, an unidentified group attacked the 4th development 
battalion from the jungle, in Narathiwat province, killing four soldiers on duty and 
stealing 380 M.16s, two M.60s, twenty-four 11 mm pistols, and seven RPG-7s. Other 
groups were also coordinately attacking police posts, setting schools afire, and burning 
tires on many roads in different places at the same time (Directorate of Intelligence, 
2008). This incident appears to have been the insurgency’s attempt to announce its war 
on the Bangkok government.  
b. Krue Sae Mosque Incident 
On April 28, 2004, many young militants with homemade weapons 
simultaneously attacked eleven police and army checkpoints in Yala, Pattani, and Sonkha 
provinces.  At the same time, thirty men mainly attacked the checkpoint near the Krue 
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Sae Mosque in Pattani province, then ran away and hid inside the Krue Sae Mosque, 
enticing the army to encompass them while they shouted aggressively and fired on some 
of the troops. The troops chose to crush them altogether. The result was that the thirty 
men in the mosque and at the other points were shot dead. The totally unexpected 
numbers pertaining to the intruders were reported to include 107 deaths, six injuries, and 
seventeen arrests; meanwhile, five officials were killed and fifteen were injured 
(“Kruesae Incident,” 2009).  The incident was well planned with the intention of having 
young Muslims killed in a place symbolic of the Pattani Empire, in order to discredit the 
authority for its cruelty. The commander of the event was accused of having no critical 
thinking skills, but the fact is that the government had no clear strategy to deal with the 
new kind of threat, so the practitioners on the field had no guideline to implement and 
made the decision on the basis of what they thought they should do.  
c. Tak Bai Incident 
In order to trap Bangkok into an even more symbolic event, on October 
25, 2004, 1,500 people came together in front of the Tak Bai police station, Narathiwat 
province, to blame the police for arresting the six innocent guards who gave their 
weapons to the insurgents. The people lacked detailed knowledge of the case, but the 
religious leaders and friends had told them to come. Without permission, some soldiers 
opened fire on the crowd and the situation quickly deteriorated. Next, 1,300 protestors 
were caught and loaded on trucks and sent to the army camp in Pattani province. 
Unfortunately, seventy-eight people, who were fasting in the month of Ramadan, died on 
the way (Klaimenee, 2008, p. 38). This was another well-planed event set to ruin the 
reputation of the regime by highlighting its brutality. The event was suddenly publicized 
to the public by the media, not excluding CD distribution by unknown sources. 
Eventually, when the situation is reconsidered, it will come to light that the ones who 
initially motivated the crowd are the real evil doers, using the suffering and death of 
innocent people as a tool for their hidden intention.  
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d. Had Yai Airport Bombing 
The insurgency also expanded its area from mainly three southern 
provinces to the capital city of Songkha province by bombing the Had Yai Airport on two 
separate occasions.  The first bombing, on April 3, 2005, resulted in one death and 
eighteen injuries.  The second bombing, on September 16, 2006, around 2100, involved 
six synchronous bombings at large shopping centers and the airport. The attacks 
reportedly resulted in four deaths and sixty-seven injured victims (“Had Yai Airport 
Bombing,” 2009). The insurgency has on other infrequent occasions tried to expand its 
operations out of the three provinces. 
e. “Daily Incidents,” Tactics and Victims 
Since January 4, 2004, violent incidents have been occurring almost daily, 
and are now referred to as “Daily Violence.” These kinds of incidents include motorcycle 
drive-by shootings; several kinds of bombings using IEDs (Improvised Explosive 
Devices); roadside bombs and ambushes on the police and army patrols; official building 
arsons; the beheading and burning of victims; leaflet propaganda; mass protests; and tire 
burnings and the dumping of twisted nails on the roads. The largest number of victims 
comes from the soft targets who cannot defend themselves, such as normal civilians (63 
percent), while the military and police each account for 10-12 percent, respectively. In 
the beginning, the selected targets were symbols of the Thai government and associated 
with either Buddhist civilians, Buddhist monks, government teachers and schools, and the 
military and police.  Eventually the targets have become random and could involve 
anyone, including Muslims themselves. From January 2004 to December 2008, the total 
count of dead and injured Buddhists was 4,279 (53 percent); the total number of dead and 
injured Muslims was 3,185 (39.5 percent) out of the total of 8,057 cases. Nonetheless, the 
total number of Muslim deaths reached 4,512 cases (56 percent), which is greater than the 
3,383 deaths of Buddhists (42 percent) (Violence-related Injury Surveillance, 2009). 
More information about the victims and number of incidents is provided in Appendix 
section A.  
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II. THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE AND STRATEGIES 
A. THE INDISCRIMINATE AND PRIVILEGED POLICY FOR MUSLIMS  
As stated in the introduction, 4.5 percent of Thai people are Muslim, and 80 
percent of Muslims live in the southernmost provinces. Even though Thailand has 
changed many of its constitutions, no constitution has been written about the national 
religion, and thus anyone can believe in any faith. Nevertheless, for administrative 
purposes, in 1938 the government tried to establish a Thai identity for the whole country 
but instead created huge opposition in the three provinces. However, after the failure of 
assimilation for the southern people, the Thai government improved many of its policies 
for Muslims. Mahidol University (2009) raised many important issues, such as that a 
large number of Thai Muslims appreciate the kindness and financial support from his 
majesty the king for translating the Quran into Thai. Royally, each year the celebration of 
the Prophet Muhamad’s birthday is held under his majesty’s patronage. His majesty has 
also appointed a state counselor for all Islamic affairs, or “Chularajamontri,” for a 
Muslim religious leader. Moreover, the government also provides a budget with which to 
build and renovate approximately 2,000 mosques and 200 Islamic schools. Ultimately, in 
the deep-south provinces, Muslim employees are allowed to leave for Muslim festivals 
and to work a half day on Friday, in order to allow for praying in a mosque; they are also 
extended a leave of four months with full salary for a Hajj pilgrim journey to Mecca. In 
addition, Mahidol University (2009) mentioned special legal provisions that have been 
incorporated in order to support the Islamic religion.  Some of these are listed below. 
 The 1974 act relating to mosques, in which the Ministry of Interior is 
responsible for the registration of mosques, and the registered mosque 
becomes a juristic person.  
 The Royal Decree on religious Patronage of the Religion of Islam in 1945 
and 1948 in which a councilor for Muslim affairs (Chularatchamontri) is 
to be appointed, and he is to be ex-officio President of the National 
Council for Muslims of Thailand as well. 
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 At an appropriate time, the Ministry of Education has been assigned to 
start the Islamic collage of Thailand so that Thai Muslims are provided 
with a place for studying and training.  
 The National Council for Muslims of Thailand is to be established 
consisting of at least five members, all of whom must be Muslim, who are 
appointed and removed by virtue of the Royal Proclamation.  
 Provincial councils for Muslims are by Decree to be set up in all provinces 
in which an appropriate number of Muslims are domiciled.  
 Each provincial is authorized by the Decree to appoint a council for each 
mosque in its province. The mosque-council, consisting of at least seven 
members, all Muslim, is presided over by an Imam who is responsible for 
the missionary work in the locality and the administrative work of the 
mosque. 
B. BEFORE SEPTEMBER 2006 
1. Before the Thaksin Regime 
In the period from 1948–1960, there were communist insurgents who fought for 
their ideology in Thailand, as well as in Malaya. As a result, Thailand encountered the 
southern separatists and the communist insurgency at the same time, even though the two 
groups had different ideologies. However, the groups shared an enemy, and that was why 
a measure of cooperation existed between them. Simultaneously, the United Kingdom 
and the Malaya government asked Thailand to help them defeat the Malaya communists 
by sealing the border and using as many other means as possible.  The Thai government 
cooperated with the Malaya government. Following that agreement, the Malaya 
communists could no longer go back and forth though the Thai border again, and they 
received no support from the locals. Finally, they surrendered.  
From 1970–1980, Thailand saw the rise of the PULO in the border jungles and in 
the north of Malaysia. Thai authorities tried very hard to suppress the PULO with the 
collaboration of Malaysia. In 1981, the Thai government, by General Prem Tinnasulanon, 
the Prime Minister, established the CPM43 and SBPAC as follows: 
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Civil-Police-Military Joint Headquarters (CPM 43) to coordinate security 
operations, which up to that time had not been synchronized and, 
therefore, created problems in implementation. One of the most important 
things that CPM 43 emphasized was to cease extra-judicial killings and 
disappearances. The government also launched a Policy of Attraction, 
aimed at drawing off sympathy from separatist groups by increasing 
political participation and lavishing economic development projects on the 
region. Large infrastructure projects, electricity and running water were 
brought into remote areas. Military personnel and government officials 
helped establish committees at the village level to promote economic 
development and security. 
The establishment of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative 
Center (SBPAC) was formed to facilitate correction of major problems in 
the administration, especially poor coordination among agencies, 
corruption and prejudice among officials. Corrupt and abusive behavior on 
the part of officials had been a significant source of grievance since the 
1940s. The SBPAC was empowered to reward, punish or remove officials 
on the basis of performance. Besides government officials, the SBPAC 
was comprised also of local religious leaders, local community leaders, 
and scholars. There was an emphasis on understanding Thai-Malay 
Muslim culture. The center also held regular seminars for Thai-Malay 
Muslim leaders to air their grievances (Klaimanee, 2008, p. 32). 
The two units were first led by the army, and later the SBPAC was controlled by 
the minister of interior. The two units worked very well with the increased cooperation 
from other officials, people, and the assistance of the government of Malaysia at that 
time. The government was very successful in minimizing the movement of the 
insurgency. In addition, the CPM43 was very effective in civil affairs, psychology and 
intelligence operations, so the government was able to access and control the people in an 
excellent manner. For a decade, the situation appeared to remain calm, but in actuality, 
recruiting activity for the insurgency continued and secret training continued in the 
Islamic schools and mountainous areas. 
2. The Thaksin Administration 
In 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra, an ex-police officer, became the Prime Minister. He 
was very successful in his own field, but not in security management. He not only 
reevaluated the activities of the southern insurgents as simply normal banditry, but also 
introduced numerous policies resulting in social disequilibrium and additional grievances 
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from the southern residents. Among the grievances were the cancellation of the SBPAC 
and CPM43, the declaration of martial law, the implementation of human abuses in Kru 
Sae and Tak Bai, the zoning of red villages, and the enactment of an emergency decree, 
respectively.  These steps are discussed in more detail below.  
In May 2002, by his own underestimation and in response to the agitation by the 
police in the area, Thaksin abolished the SBPAC and CPM43 and turned the power of 
security management over to the police. He also offered the declaration of the “War on 
Drugs,” which killed 2,500 individuals in an extrajudicial manner all over the country, 
including the south (Klaimanee, 2008, p. 35). After these actions, the number of violent 
incidents per year increased during the period from 2001-2004 from approximately 114, 
82, and 84 to 1,843, respectively, as shown in Figure 4. The situation took a turn for the 
worse, and on June 27, 2003, the government reestablished the SBPAC and changed the 
name to the Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command (SBPPBC) with 
similar roles to that of the old organization (Ampunan, 2007, p. 21). Unfortunately, the 
government realized that one of its biggest problems was the lack of both intelligence and 
cooperation from the people because access to villages was dismantled when the CPM43 
was disbanded.  
 
Figure 2.   The Number of Incidents (1993–2004) (From: “Terrorism,” 2009) 
 19
On January 4, 2004, unpredictably, the insurgency started a war against the 
government and followed up with many incidents that escalated daily during the first four 
years. Suddenly, on January 5, 2004, Thaksin imposed martial law in the three provinces, 
allowing troops to make arrests without judicial warrant and detain a suspect within a 
seven day period. As previously mentioned, at first the threat of a terrorist insurgency 
was a very new issue for the Thai government, which lacked an understanding of not only 
how to deal with it, but how to develop a clear strategy for the low level practitioners. 
This gave the insurgency an opportunity to advance through its initiatives and 
unpredictable patterns. Fighting the insurgency by primarily responding to the insurgents’ 
initiative placed the Thai government in the position of underdog. Moreover, after 
Thaksin declared that he would not negotiate with the insurgents, field commanders used 
this declaration as the justification for the use of excessive force.  This led to abuses of 
human rights in Krue Sae in April 2004 and in Tak Bai in October 2004. All of this 
negative effort was looked upon as evidence of the alienation and injustice experienced 
by the southern inhabitants, and motivated some of the people to help the counter-state. 
This furthered the social disequilibrium more than anyone expected. 
Despite the above negative effort, December 5, 2004, became significant,, not 
only significant as the king’s birthday, but also as the day that the Thai government under 
Thaksin asked all Thai people to fold paper birds, the symbol of peace, for later dropping 
onto the south. One hundred and twenty million paper birds were flown and dropped on 
to the southern border provinces of Thailand. Even so, there was still no sign of improved 
collaboration from the southern population.  
The former paragraph is an example of the implementation of psychology 
operations at the national level. Only a few television and radio stations chose to 
broadcast peace-promoting programs initiated by the government.  This was mainly 
because those programs did not bring about as much monetary benefit to the stations as 
broadcasting non-governmental programs. Should the government make a greater effort 
to support the peace promoting by promoting programs politically and monetarily, such a 
failure to maintain the psychology operations at the national level would occur.  Despite 
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these actions, it was proven, nonetheless, that the Thai people had a willingness to help 
the southern people if an appropriate circumstance could be arranged. 
In February 2005, Prime Minister Thaksin prioritized 1,580 southern villages for 
three levels of security: red, yellow, and green. The 350 red villages were judged to be 
sympathetic to the insurgents and would receive no funding because he was afraid that 
the funds would help the insurgency to enact more incidents of violence (BBC News, 
2005).This decision not only highlighted the disparity between those 1,580 villages and 
provided incentives for people to further support the insurgents, they also displayed this 
disparity to external actors, the international community.  
On July 19, 2005, the administration published the Emergency Decree, intended 
as a more acceptable form of martial law. The decree provided immunity from 
prosecution for the forces operating in the south, and suspended the jurisdiction of the 
court system to prosecute officials for their actions (Crisis Group, 2005): it gave more  
power to state officials to arrest and detain suspects.  It failed to regain the trust of local 
people toward the government and somehow made the situation worse (AFP, 2006).  As 
the HRW (2007) states: 
The decree is to arrest and detain suspects without charge, restrict 
movement and communication, censor the media, and deny access to 
redress for victims of abuses by government officials and security 
personnel the decree allowed authorities to detain suspects for 30 days or 
longer in unregistered “safe houses.” The legislation also created the 
possibility that detainees may be held in secret, undisclosed, or 
inaccessible locations where monitoring is impossible and there is no 
judicial oversight or access to legal counsel or family. (pp. 39-40) 
C. AFTER SEPTEMBER 2006 
On September 19, 2006, General Surayud Julanont, a former member of Special 
Forces, became Prime Minister after a bloodless military coup. He enacted the Internal 
Security Act in 2007 to reestablish the Internal Security Operations Command 4 (ISOC 
4), which is commanded by the 4th Army Area Commander, a Lieutenant General. The 
ISOC4 is comprised of four organic units: (1) the CPM43 as a military wing; (2) the 
SBPAC as a socio-economic wing, which is organic regarding the mix of strategies 
 21
associated with peace building, reconciliation, and the use of security forces; (3) an 
intelligence center to coordinate all intelligence units in the higher and lower levels; and 
(4) the Police Special Task Force in charge of investigation and arresting of suspects.  
1. The Use of Force 
The CPM 43 deployed a six-month rotation of 18,000 police officers; 30,000 
military troops from all parts of Thailand; and 18,000 local volunteers from the ministry 
of the interior, including 4,000 local soldiers from the 15th Light Infantry Division, 
widely over the provinces (Chalk, Rabasa, Rosenau & Piggott, 2009, p. 107).  The total 
number of personnel for the force was 66,000, or twenty-one Infantry Battalions of 
military troops (seven Infantry Regiments). The CPM 43 was subordinated by six main 
units, of which all the province task forces are commanded by a Major General, except 
Task Force Songkha, which is under a Colonel Commander: 
 Task Force Yala (Task Force 1) is composed of troops from the 3rd and 4th 
Army Area, which is organized out of six battalions. 
 Task Force Patani (Task Force 2) is composed of troops from the 2nd and 
4th Army Area and organized out of six battalions. 
 Task Force Narathiwat (Task Force 3) is composed of troops from the 1st 
and 4th Army Area and Marine Task Force which is organized out of nine 
battalions. 
 Task Force Songkha (Task Force 4) is comprised of troops from the 4th 
Army Area, which is organized out of two to three battalions. The Task 
Force’s Area of Operation is the four districts of Songkha province that 
are also experiencing turmoil. 
 Santhisuk Task Force is mainly subordinated by Special Force 
Detachments and CA & PSYOP teams that work with local village leaders 
to help build popular trust and confidence in the state’s security and 
measures.  
 Anothai Task Force is the logistic and general support unit that consists of 
the teams of Explosive Ordnance Disposal and aviation teams. 
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The mission of the troops is to enhance security, restore law and order by daily 
patrols, and provide symbolic target escort such as for Buddhist monks and teachers. 
Apart from that, the mostly locally recruited 7,500 paramilitary plays an important role as 
a border patrol, light screening force, intelligence collection source, and civic action 
force. The paramilitary works very well by taking advantage of common elements such 
as the same local language and culture. Incidents of violence have fluctuated, but trended 
dramatically upward from January 2004 to May 2007, despite the fact that the numbers 
increased during the mid-year of every year. In June 2007, the government decided to 
begin an offensive of searching for suspects by enclosing villages related to the better 
intelligence that had been gained from the greater cooperation of the people. Later, a 
curfew enforcement was announced in an effort to limit the freedom of movement of the 
insurgents. The resulting aftermath was that the number of incidents was sharply reduced, 
though the number of deaths and casualties still fluctuated as is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.   The Total Number of Incidents from January 2004 to July 2009 (From: Violence-
related Injury Surveillance, 2009) 
2. The Policies of an Indirect Approach  
In the early part of 2004, after the insurgency launched an attack on the 4th 
development battalion in Narathiwat province, the King distributed His Majesty’s 
suggestion for the south crisis: “understand, reach out, and develop.” Unfortunately, this 
Started  Offensive 
Operation in June 2007 
Blue: total number of incidents 
Red: number of injury 
Black: number of deaths 
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suggestion had not been followed by the Thaksin government very well.  In contrast, the 
Juranon government put forth a strong effort to manipulate that philosophy. In January 
2007, the government set up an ad hoc Special Economic Development Zone (SEDZ) to 
promote economic development, and stimulate education and social satisfaction. In 
addressing the malfunctions of the justice system, the government tried to rebuild trust in 
the southern communities by dedicating a Justice Maintenance Center to examine reports 
of misbehaving officials. In addition, hundreds of Special Forces were sent to the 
Santisuk Force, which works with the chiefs of villages to build trust and confidence. 
In October 2006, Prime Minister Julanont made a public apology to the south for 
the wrong policies of the previous government and welcomed the leaders of the 
insurgents to negotiate. He cancelled all the blacklists of the rebels and encouraged 
amnesty programs (Klaimanee, 2008, p. 79). Yet, no official agreement was made, and 
even though some of the PULO representatives in the countries that supported them have 
broadcast their intention to talk, it seems they cannot communicate to their field 
combatants, while the real leaders behind the violent incidents do not want to reveal 
themselves. In fact, the way that the insurgents communicate with the government is 
through the number of incidents in a given period of time, as well as the number of 
deaths, injuries, and the kinds of targets and victims. These statistics and actions indicate, 
more or less, what the insurgents are thinking. 
Normally, regular forces are used for the direct approach that will be discussed 
later in the next chapter. However, in the south of Thailand operations, the regular forces 
are also used to conduct Civil Affair and Psychology Operations (CA and PSYOP) due to 
the shortages in a number of the most suitable units, specifically the Special Forces. 
Therefore, it was made mandatory by the army that the regular forces must also be 
trained to be able to conduct CA and PSYOP before their deployment. All battalions that 
will operate in the south are trained in CA and PSYOP for at least three months. 
Nevertheless, most regular forces are Infantry Battalions that possess many privates 
trained to fight only in a conventional warfare. It is very difficult to make those privates 
understand the concepts of CA and PSYOP and become capable of conducting such 
operations. In spite of this, these privates have gradually learned some skills on the job. 
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Normally each battalion from other parts of Thailand is deployed to the south for a period 
of six months and then replaced by a new battalion.  However, the situation has lasted 
longer than expected, so that previously deployed battalions might be redeployed to the 
south again. This redeployment in turn results in an improvement in the CA and PSYOP 
skills of the individual soldiers. Although, there are many more CA and PSYOP 
missions, medical visits and agriculture teaching are the missions that are mostly 
provided to the villagers in the south by these battalions. 
After approximately one year of implementing the new strategy, the number of 
violent incidents was statistically reduced, but the numbers of deaths and injuries have 
continued to fluctuate. The 4th Army Area and ISOC4 Commander was interviewed and 
stated that the number of red villages has been reduced to 217, and these villages were 
more accessible (Matichon, 2009). It is estimated that the insurgency has less freedom of 
movement as a result of the force pressure, and people are showing more satisfaction 
with the state’s numerous soft programs. Despite that perceived increase in satisfaction, 
though, the government could not estimate the exact attitude of the southern people 
regarding its new strategy, but the general election result of December 23, 2007 showed 
that about 77 percent of eligible people of the three provinces came to vote. It was 
approximately eight percent greater than in the capital city of Bangkok, as shown in 
Table 1. This was an important indicator that many people still support democracy and 
that not many people seek a new, independent state. Unfortunately, this implied support 
does not include the core groups of leaders and their covert fighters, as evidenced by the 










24 Yala 287,676 224,655 78.09 475,527 
26 Narathiwat 441,122 3425,87 77.66 719,930 
31 Pattani 390,050 303,517 76.64 642,169 
69 Bangkok 4,148,974 2,866,028 69.08 5,710,883 
 
Table 1.   The Voters of General Election on December 23, 2007 in the South Provinces 
(From: Office of the Election Commission of Thailand, 2007; and Population Column 
from Minister of Interior: Department of Demography, 2009) 
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III. COUNTERINSURGENCY MODELS 
A. THE DIAMOND MODEL  
 
Figure 4.   The Mystic Diamond (From: Wikimedia Commons, 2009) 
Professor Gordon McCormick of the Naval Postgraduate School is an 
internationally recognized expert in the field of Counterinsurgency (COIN). His Mystic 
Diamond is a useful model with which to apply and explain the interactive relationships 
among the State (COIN Force), Counter-State (Insurgent Force), Population, and 
International Community as shown above in Figure 4. The description indicated in Table 
2 represents each interaction of the state and counter-state and the two actor’s strategies.  
 
Government Strategies  
 
Insurgent Strategies 
1. To control people 
2.To break counter-state control of 
people 
3. To strive counter-state force 
4.To undermine external support 
for counter-state 
5. To foster an external support 
1. To control people 
2. To break government control  of 
people 
3. To strive government force 
4. To undermine external support 
for government 
5. To foster an external support 




The government is comprised of all official authorities including the 
military, police, and other official agencies that have the responsibility of 
counterinsurgency. The government will manipulate the five strategies shown in the 
Table 2. 
b. Counter-state 
The counter-state actor is composed of those groups and individuals 
resistant to the government for a variety of reasons, including differences in ethnicity, 
religion, political ideologies and goals; as well as for reasons of nationalism, political 
suppression, or grievances resulting from the government’s policies, etc. The counter-
state will also employ the same five strategies as the state. 
c. Population 
This player represents all inhabitants who live in the area of conflict. The 
people may choose to support the state or counter-state, so that the latter two actors are in 
competition to draw the people to their respective side. Many scholars argue that the 
population is the key terrain and call this kind of war, “the war on people support.” 
d. International Community 
This element provides external support to, either the state or non-state 
actors. 
2. Strategies 
a. Strategy 1 
Both sides need to control the people, or win the support of the people, in 
order to gain the advantage and receive intelligence. The government needs to build 
legitimacy and provide a response to what the people need in order to control them. This 
high degree of control depends on a high degree of consensus. During the attempts in 
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which the government tries to control people, the counter-state performs the same action. 
The counter-state uses IO and PSYOP, including either propaganda or threatening people 
in order to gain access to the infrastructure. 
b. Strategy 2 
Both actors need to counter and defeat the other side’s efforts to control 
the people. The government will conduct IO and PSYOP and counter-IO and PSYOP, 
while increasing security measures intended to separate the people from the counter-state, 
and deny the counter-state access to the infrastructure. The counter-state will operate 
upon the same stage by using IO and PSYOP and counter-IO and PSYOP to discredit the 
security measures. 
c. Strategy 3 
Both players will use force against each other. The state will neutralize, 
disrupt, and arrest the strength of counter-state. Meanwhile, during that time the counter-
state will launch small to high scale operations within its capabilities, such as ambushes 
and attacks on officials. 
d. Strategies 4 and 5 
Both sides will attempt to draw external support from the international 
community while prohibiting the other from doing so, since both players need to achieve 
a level of legitimacy and righteousness from the international perspective. The 
government will utilize diplomacy to achieve corroboration and understanding from the 
externals. Without subsidization from outside the state, the counter-state will encounter 
difficulty in maintaining its resistance, since the external support always includes greater 
resources including financing, weapons, training, new technologies, and ideology. Also, 
if, from an international perspective, the state is regarded negatively, the state likely will 
be interfered with by the international actor.  
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B. ARREGUIN-TOFT’S ASYMMETRIC MODEL  
 
Figure 5.   Arreguin-Toft’s Asymmetric Model (From: Arreguin-Toft, 2001, p. 108) 
Arreguin-Toft (2001) mentioned that strong actors will frequently lose the war 
between strong actors and weak actors if strong actors apply the wrong strategy. On the 
other hand, weak actors will win the battle if they utilize the right approach. He also 
mentioned that the percentages of incidents where the weak wins the conflict over the 
strong increased from the periods of 1800–1849 and from 1950–1998, while the victories 
of the strong have been decreasing, particularly in the period from 1950–1998, during 
which time the number of victories of the weak was ten percent greater than that of the 
strong. In addition, the better armed the weak is, the more chance there is that the strong 
will lose. Nevertheless, authoritarian strong actors win asymmetric wars more than 
democratic strong actors, regardless of the weak actors’ use of an indirect strategy. 
Arreguin-Toft (2001, p. 100) also defined the meaning of grand strategy, while Ampunan 
(2007, p. 43) described the definition of direct and indirect approaches as follows: 
 Grand strategy refers to the totality of an actor’s resources directed toward 
military, political, economic, or other objectives. 
 Direct Strategic Approach: This is an approach in which both factions of 
attack and defense use conventional maneuvers. Targets of the campaign 
aim to destroy the opponent’s armed forces, fighting as soldier-to-soldier, 
and following the rules of engagement. 
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 Indirect Strategic Approach: This is an approach that is free from a 
pattern, but both factions use all kinds of means to conquer their opponent, 
including murdering, torturing, or detaining non-combatants. 
Despite the fact that the meaning of the indirect approach above is not very clear, 
it, nonetheless, considers that other strategies—apart from the use of direct force—
include diplomacy, IO and PSYOP, development, law enforcement and legitimacy, 
capacity building, soft power, and so on. 
The outcomes of each course of action, as theorized by Arreguin-Toft (2001) are 
as quoted follows:  
 Hypothesis 1: When strong actors attack using a direct strategy and weak 
actors defend using a direct strategy, all other things being equal, strong 
actors should win quickly and decisively. 
 Hypothesis 2: When strong actors attack with a direct strategy and weak 
actors defend using an indirect strategy, all other things being equal, weak 
actors should win. 
 Hypothesis 3: When strong actors attack using an indirect strategy and 
weak actors defend using a direct strategy, all other things being equal, 
strong actors should lose. 
 Hypothesis 4: When strong actors employ barbarism to attack weak actors 
defending with guerrilla warfare strategy (GWS), all other things being 
equal, strong actors should win. 
 Hypothesis 5: Strong actors are more likely to win same-approach 
interactions and lose opposite-approach interactions. (Klaimanee, 2008, p. 
63) 
C. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A DEFINITION OF TERRORISM, 
VICTIMS, AND THE USE OF MEDIA BY TERRORISTS 
Insurgent groups that resurged in the south of Thailand around 2004 have changed 
their approach from that of guerrilla warfare to terrorism. There has been more than one 
definition used to describe the word terrorism. In the contexts of this thesis, the author 
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has chosen to accept the definition used by many scholars that “terrorism” is a tactic for 
applying violence, instead of a group of individuals who act as terrorists. This tactic is 
commonly used in asymmetric warfare, which involves victims or targets chosen by 
terrorists and also the use of media as a tool for the terrorists to send messages to their 
audiences.   Bale (2009) offered an example of the definition chosen by this author. 
 Terrorism is the use or threatened use of violence, directed against victims 
selected for their symbolic or representative value, as a means of instilling 
anxiety in, transmitting one or more messages to, and thereby 
manipulating the perceptions and behavior of wider target audiences. 
 Victims are never selected at random. They must not necessarily be 
civilians. The target has not to even be human (e.g., Statue of Liberty).  A 
Victim is an instrument used by the perpetrators to represent something 
for the wider audiences.  
 The relationship between terrorists and media is a symbiotic one. The 
media depends on terrorist to provide news worthy events. Terrorists rely 
upon the media to spread their message. Terrorist groups seek attention, 
but want to remain secret. The media amplifies the significance of the 
news, the psychological impact. The media is unwillingly helping the 
terrorists to reach a wider audience. Sensationalism can help spread fear 
and anxiety, and this facilitates one of the terrorist goals. If a terrorist 
event is suppressed, it might encourage terrorist to engage in larger scale 
of attacks that would be impossible to cover up.  In other words it 
encourages the terrorists to do more harm than they would have initially. 
D. COMPARISON OF THE MODELS AND DEFINITIONS 
Referring to McCormick’s Model, most of the strategies should be considered 
using the indirect approach of Arreguin-Toft’s Model, except that of the government’s 
Strategy 3.  If it is only using force against the others, it should be called the direct 
approach. The descriptive analysis of the Diamond Model above did not clarify that the 
state utilizes an indirect approach against the force of the counter-state. Simultaneously, 
the Strategy 3 of the counter-state can be an indirect approach when it uses a quick small 
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scale attack and suddenly runs away, but it can also be a direct approach when it is 
comparatively stronger and uses a high scale attack.  However, if the government is 
successful in using Strategies 1, 2, 4 and 5 over the people and the international 
community, and the counter-state fails to do so, then Strategy 3, although a direct attack, 
shows no weakness.  
Apart from the above, Arreguin-Toft explained the use of both direct and indirect 
strategies of the two players, but did not mention the international actor and only offered 
slight reference to the supportive population or national consensus (Arreguin-Toft, 2001 
pp. 104, 109, 123). Thus, he tried to predict the outcomes of the wars by focusing on the 
strategies with the assumption that all other things were equal. Thus, his Strategy 3 is 
always accomplished when fighting the weak who use guerrilla warfare without the 
support of the people and the international actor, since it confirms Arreguin-Toft’s 
hypotheses 1, 4, and 5 that if both sides operate a direct strategy, or the strong force uses 
a direct approach against guerrilla warfare, or both sides apply the same strategy and all 
other things are equal, the strong actor will win. 
Bale’s definition of terrorism, victims of terrorists, and the relationship between 
terrorist and media can be related to the Diamond’s Strategies 1 and 2 of the counter-
state, which are to control people by threatening to block the control of the people by the 
state by discrediting the security measures, since the counter-state endeavors to control 
people both by propaganda and threats. The propaganda is targeted to influence the 
ideology or beliefs of the people, while the threatening of terrorist tactics is used to 
control the people through fear and to psychologically block the state’s control of the 
people. Therefore, the victims will be selected specifically for that purpose. Henceforth, 
the media is used to send messages to the state, the population and the international 
community related to these purposes. Those kinds of tactics are attuned and imitable in 
the information age and should be considered as indicative of the indirect strategy noted 
by Arreguin-Toft.  
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
In reviewing the related literatures on insurgency and counter-insurgency, many 
cases emerge of successful and failed insurgencies before and after the eras of 
colonization, the Cold War, and the information age. In those cases, the five strategies in 
the Mystic Diamond model play a very important role in the victory or defeat of the 
respective states. The direct strategy, discussed in Chapter 3, is not always applicable by 
states attempting to resolve an insurgency situation, especially when the counter-state has 
gained control of the people either by ideological indoctrination or through the use of 
violence. However, the direct strategy does work when the counter-state does not gain 
control over the people or lacks the support from people. As previously stated, conflicts 
between the state and counter-state are rooted in many factors, e.g., the conceptual 
differences in their ideologies, differences in ethnicities, socio-economic disparities, 
socio-psychological issues, and political problems.  
Four cases of insurgencies, occurring in the countries that can be comparable 
geographically, ethnically, chronologically, religiously, and developmentally to the 
insurgency in the south of Thailand; were selected to be reviewed and analyzed in this 
study in order to discover possible solutions for resolving the insurgency in Thailand.   
Each of these cases also reflects a similar influence from colonization, the Cold War, and 
the information age. With these factors largely held constant, it is easier to assess the 
impact of the respective actors’ policy choices on reducing violence. 
A. MALAYAN INSURGENCY (1930–1960) 
Ampunan (2007) wrote that the insurgency of the Malayan Communist Party 
(MCP) was first formed in 1930 through Marxist inspiration and by Chinese Malaya 
members who opposed colonization. After 1937, the group was armed by the British to 
fight the Japanese who invaded Indo-China. After that, the group changed their name to 
the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) and the Malayan Races Liberation 
Army (MRLA). Then in 1948, the government of Malaya declared a state of emergency 
 34
due to the rise of violence caused by the group. Finally, in 1958–1960, the members of 
the group turned themselves in to the government.  
Many factors contributed to the end of the MCP movement. The first was that the 
MCP utilized the Mao Zedong revolution to fight the government by attempting to 
enlarge the occupied territory from the jungles to the urban and city zones. However, 
accomplishing that plan required gaining a majority of support from the locals, but the 
MCP lacked that support because the group was ethnic Chinese, while the indigenous 
people were Malay, and the locals mostly admired the British, despite having been 
colonized for many years. Finally, the Maoist revolution in Malaya was merely a dream 
that never came true. In addition, the government used a form of restricted registration in 
which it became very easy to distinguish the Chinese from the Malays. Moreover, the 
food control campaign made survival for the MCP difficult. In addition, the sealing of the 
border through cooperation with the Thai authorities also put the counter-state in trouble, 
due to its safe haven being shut down. Apart from that, the government declared amnesty 
for the insurgents who wanted to surrender. Lastly, the Malaysian Police and Army 
worked in concert, i.e., the use of police to restore law and order in the cities and the use 
of the army to crush the Chinese guerrillas in the jungle, leading to the victory of 
Malaysian government.  This was confirmed in Klaimanee (2008):  
Although the military role in COIN was essential to success, it was 
limited. In the early years, the military had to assist the police and 
paramilitary forces in static security missions. But later on these tasks 
were gradually taken over by police and auxiliaries. Then, the military 
could turn to suppressing the guerrillas in the jungle. The military role in 
the Malayan Emergency was not of a typical character. Instead of 
operating as a large force and having their own command, units were 
dispersed and used in support of civil authority (p69). 
By Mid-1954, the new Director of Operations…modified the strategy 
from “rolling up the insurgents from south to north” into destroying the 
insurgent organization in the weakest area first. An area clear of the 
insurgents would be declared as “white.” The government force then 
moved to other “black” areas and cleared each of them. This strategy 
gradually worked. By mid-1955, a third of Malaya’s population lived in 




down. There was a mass surrender during 1957-1958. The few tough 
black areas were finally cleared in 1959. The Emergency was officially 
terminated in July 1960 (p. 72). 
According to the Diamond Model, the most important reason why the MCP was 
so easily defeated that the government responded to its needs for popularity (Strategy 1) 
and external support (Strategy 5). In this case, the support of the local people and the 
neighboring country was completely blocked. Apart from that, the counter-state could not 
control the villagers while the government was able to (Strategy 1 and 2). The ethno-
nationalists played a very important role in separating the people from the counter-state, 
so that the Malays did not assist the Chinese insurgency in fighting the government and 
remained loyal to the government and the United Kingdom. Moreover, the cooperation 
between the Thai and Malaya governments was also indispensable in limiting the MCP’s 
access to its safe haven along the porous border (Strategy 4 and 5). Furthermore, the 
government directed the police force to treat insurgency-related activities as criminal 
incidents in order to gain more legitimacy, control the people, and enhance the positive 
perspective of the international actors (Strategy 1, 2, 4 and 5). Last but not least, 
according to hypotheses 1, 4, and 5 of Arreguin-Toft’s Model, if both sides utilize the 
same approach, the strong actor will win.  In this case, the counter-state applied guerrilla 
warfare in order to fight directly, and the indirect approach used to control the people of 
the MCP did not work. The army successfully suppressed the militants in the jungle area.  
Finally, the government exploited the outcome by granting amnesty to the ex-combatants 
who surrendered.  In that regard, that the government applied an indirect approach again 
in order to control the ex-counter-state members who transformed themselves into normal 
citizens.   
B. COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THAILAND (1933–1980S) 
The Chinese Communist Party of Thailand (CCPT) was founded in 1933 
(Maisonti, 2004, p. 37) by Chinese members who were linked with communist parties in 
China and Vietnam. At that time, the Thais welcomed the Chinese to Thailand, but not 
the Chinese Communist Party. This caused the CCPT to drop the word Chinese in its 
name to become the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) in 1942. After the MCP failed 
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in its efforts in Malaya, the CPT declared an armed struggle with the Thai government in 
1961 (Maisonti, 2004, p. 38). The concept of the Mao Zedong revolution was utilized 
again in the jungle and mountainous areas, then spread to urban and city areas together 
with propaganda. According to the “domino theory,” if a country is turned into a 
communist administration, neighboring countries will be transformed into communist 
nations as well. The revolution began with Russia and spread to China, North Korea, 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Therefore, it was projected that if Thailand were 
transformed into a communist state, the rest of Southeast Asia would follow suit and the 
region would become a collection of communist countries as well. This belief led to the 
great subsidization from the communist community for the CPT, including training and 
providing weapons, so that the number CPT members in the jungles grew very fast at that 
time. 
According to Mao Zedong, one of the most important factors needed for 
revolution is the repression or grievances of the people stemming from government 
policies or from the government’s lack of control over the people. The CPT focused on 
farmers, laborers, and students. Unfortunately, after Thailand transformed into a 
democracy, there were many military coups, and the leaders of the country were solely 
drawn from those among the highest-ranking military leadership, or highly placed in the 
dictatorship.  This was not acceptable to Thai people who were very disappointed with 
the situation because of the suspicion that they had never had a real democracy, but only 
a transformation of power from the absolute monarchy to the military dictatorship.  As a 
consequence, the CPT exploited the disappointment of people as a political condition 
from which to draw support from people. This was implemented mostly by using radio 
broadcasts and other means of communications.  A statement like, “Thailand will have a 
utopia and people will govern their own country, if people join the CPT,” was used.  The 
radio also spread Anti-American propaganda, particularly about the growth of U.S. 
activities in Thailand (Maisonti, 2004, p. 38). Suddenly, after that propaganda wave, 
there was the chaos of mass protests led by university students and a responsive crush by 
the military. In October 1973, many of those students and also ordinary Thai people 
joined the CPT and were trained to be militants of the CPT. These militants were also 
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brainwashed through communist ideological indoctrination. The group of people who 
joined the CPT in October 1973 were later recognized as the “People of October.”. 
During this time, the government, in response, tried to diminish the conflict by forming 
the Communist Operation Command (CSOC), as Maisonti (2004) notes:   
The Thai government responded to the communist insurgency by 
establishing the Communist Suppression Operation Command (CSOC) 
which was led by the Royal Thai Army in December 1965, and charged 
with coordinating the various government agencies (Marks, 1996). The 
CSOC made a Thai Counterinsurgency Doctrine called the “CPM (Civil- 
Police-Military)” This doctrine authorized the coordinated application of 
all resources to the insurgency problem including a mix of civil, police, 
and purely military measures. The essential tasks of this doctrine were to 
militarily create security in the areas, to control by policing the population 
and resources, and to eliminate by civil service units the reasons for any 
grievance originating from the social or economic inequalities. (p. 39) 
In the 1970s, many Chinese Thais went to visit their relatives in China, including 
some elite officials, and these Chinese Thais informed the elite officials of the difficulties 
regarding the turmoil in Thailand. Then the support for the CPT decreased, and many 
militants found themselves living hopelessly in the jungles.  Many calls were heard from 
their relatives, as the militants sought a way to return home. In spite of the above 
difficulties, the number of CPT militants in 1979 remained high, i.e., 12,000 militants, 
and the CPT still successfully carried on activities in 35 out of 71 provinces (Randolph & 
Thompson, 1981; and Maisonti, 2004, p. 39). Subsequently, the Thai government 
exploited the fall of the CPT in 1980 and drew the militants back in to the normal Thai 
society by offering them amnesty programs, and political opportunities. In order to make 
those militants who turned themselves in proud of their actions, the term “Thailand 
Development Coordinators” was adopted to refer to them. Many ex-CPTs who attended 
the amnesty program are now well-known politicians and Members of the House of 
Representatives. As Klaimanee (2008,) stated: 
This new strategy caused hundreds of Communists to give up their armed 
struggle. This doctrine later became known as Prime Minister’s Order 
66/2523, better known as “The Policy to win over the Communists.” This 
order was under the direction of then Prime Minister General Prem 
Tinsulanon and the Army Operations Center Director Major General 
Chavalit Yongchaiyudth. Two years later in 1982, Prime Minister’s Order 
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65/2525, also known as the “Plan for the Political Offensive,” was 
announced. Order Number 66/2523 should be seen as establishing the 
political offensive to be used against the Communist Party of Thailand 
(CPT), while 65/2525 provided for implementation (p. 31). 
As previously stated, the end of the communists’ insurgency in Thailand reflects 
the premise of McCormick’s Diamond that when an insurgency receives less support 
from both outside the country and from the people, it finds itself in trouble. After fighting 
for a long time, many Thai comrades found that the promised Chinese Communist utopia 
was not the reality that they had struggled for, and the communist insurgency could no 
longer control the people, while the state could. Last but far from least, according to 
hypotheses 1, 4, and 5 of Arreguin-Toft’s Model, if both sides utilize the same approach, 
the strong actor will win.  In this case, the militants who still remained in the jungle, after 
the majority of them had turned themselves in, had attempted the direct approach in 
fighting with the Thai government. The government, the stronger actor, then successfully 
used the direct approach to suppress the militants in the jungle. After its victory resulting 
from the direct approach, the government turned to apply an indirect approach to expand 
the outcome by granting amnesty to the ex-militants who agreed to surrender. In essence, 
the government applied an indirect approach to control the ex-counter-state.  As a matter 
of fact, some militants had no choice but to surrender only to utilize the amnesty program 
offered by the government.  But these ex-militants still believed in the communism 
ideology, and continued fighting for their ideology through the democratic channels, 
especially those who become the high-ranking members of the current government. 
Again, these ex-militants are trying to use an indirect approach in the current 
governmental arena to serve their own ideology and try to lead and gain control of the 
Thai society.    
C. ABU SAYYAF (ASG) AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM IN THE 
PHILIPPINES (OEF-PHILIPPINES) 
1. Abu Sayyaf (ASG) 
Abu Sayyaf (ASG) was founded in 1991 by Abduragak Abubakar Janjalani, the 
ex-commando or mujahideen from Afghanistan. Abubakar was killed in 1998 and 
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Khadafi Janjalani became the leader before he was killed by Philippine troops in 
September 2006. After that, the leadership has been splintered. Abu Sayyaf means 
“Father of the Swordsman” in Arabic. The ASG movement was based in the southern 
Philippines, primarily the Sulu archipelago, Basilan, Jolo, and Tawi-Tawi. Aquino (2009) 
presented the objectives of ASG:  
 To wage jihad against the Philippine government in reaction to the so-
called atrocities committed against Muslims in the Philippines. 
 To unite the Philippine Muslims minority to fight for a separate Islamic 
state and encompassing the southern Philippines. 
 To strengthen Islamic faith in the southern Philippines. 
 To eliminate elements of oppression.  
 To establish a government that implements Sharia law.  
ASG has links to Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, a Saudi businessman; Osama Bin 
Ladin’s brother in-law who is living in the Philippines; Fathour Roman Al Gozi, Omar 
Patek and Dulmatin, all members of Jammah Islamiyah; and also other activities and 
groups associated with Philippine terrorists.  
2. Operation Enduring Freedom in the Philippines (OEF - Philippines) 
From January 2002 until July 31, 2002, the United States committed 
nearly 1,300 troops to the Philippines to assist Philippine armed forces 
(AFP) in operations against the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in the southern 
Philippines, on the island of Basilan southwest of Mindanao. From 2005 
into 2007, the U.S. committed up to 450 military personnel to western 
Mindanao and Jolo island south of Basilan These U.S. non-combat, 
support operations were in response to Philippine President Arroyo’s 
strong support of the United States following the September 11 Al Qaeda 
attack on the United States. (Niksh, 2007) 
Wilson (2006) wrote that the OEF-P succeeded against ASG on Basilan Island in 
2002 by building the capacity of the Philippines Armed Forces (AFP) and utilizing Civil 
Affair and Information Operations. Many referred to this mission as the “Basilan Model,” 
which was based on an indirect approach. Primarily, in October 2001, the Pacific 
Command deployed a team of Special Forces to conduct a Preparation of the Area of 
Operation and to collect critical information in order to evaluate the root cause of the 
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conflict. In February 2002, 160 highly skilled Special Force operatives were added. The 
United States worked closely with the Philippines Armed Forces in numerous tasks 
including increasing legitimacy, securing the environment, protection of their people, 
patrolling, Humanitarian and Civic Action Projects, and extensive information collection. 
By August 2002, this cooperation had isolated more people from the insurgents in 
accordance with the increase in intelligence being reported. Many displaced persons who 
had fled from the unrest came back to the area. Following the success of the OEF-P, the 
United States and the Philippines agreed to organize the Joint Special Operations Task 
Force, Philippines (JSOTF-P) to counter the insurgency in Mindanao and Sulu Island as 
well.  
The success of the indirect approach by capacity building and information 
operations in the Basilan Model is one of the great cases to study. The most important 
fact is that the ASG sustained its movement by kidnapping and extortion, so that when 
people were strongly protected and isolated, the insurgents lacked the necessary resources 
for their movement. This accomplishment is emphasized by the provision of external 
support to the state and the corresponding isolation of the people from the counter-state 
as depicted in the Diamond Model. The counter-state could not control the people while 
the government was successfully doing so. Also, the state was successful because it chose 
to use the right strategy. According to Arreguin-Toft, since the counter-state applied an 
indirect approach by threatening people and committing other violent incidents, the 
government chose to apply an indirect approach as well, through IO, capacity building, 
development, and so on. In accordance with hypothesis 5 of Arreguin-Toft’s Model, if 
both sides utilize the same approach, the strong actor will win.   
D. ACEH CONFLICT 
Aceh refers to the westernmost part of Sumatra Island and, geographically, the 
first sea port if one traveling from the Indian Ocean to Indonesia. For many Muslims in 
the region, it is considered and referred to as “Serambi Mekkah,” or the “Verandah of 
Mecca.” In the past, Aceh was also a kingdom ruled by the king (or Sultan). Aquino, 
Putranto, and Rodthong (2009) mentioned that Aceh experienced a long history of 
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resistance during the colonial periods of the Dutch beginning in 1874. Since then, the 
Acehnese struggle and resistance against foreign domination had never been completely 
suppressed until Aceh became part of the new Indonesian Republic that proclaimed 
independence from the Dutch in 1945. However, over time the government of Indonesia 
(GOI) failed to integrate the Acehnese culture and identity into the new republic, and 
failed similarly to effectively address issues affecting the Acehnese socio-economic and 
political interest. These failures created frustration and fostered grievances against the 
central government in Java, and further alienated the Acehnese. Consequently, this gave 
way to the rise and fall of several insurgent movements.  
The first resistance uprising against the government was during the 1950s when 
the Acehnese joined other provinces in the “Darul Islam Movement” that advocated 
changing Indonesia’s secular state into an Islamic state. The conflict was sparked by a 
demand for independence. The central government, however, integrated the Aceh region 
into the North Sumatra province. This decision, of course, was met with dissatisfaction 
and grievances among the Acehnese. Later, more socio-economic and political issues 
significantly affected the Acehnese. After Suharto took power from Sukarno as president 
in 1967, the New Order regime, which was dominated by the armed forces, emerged. In 
1970, the discovery of a huge oil and natural gas reserve in the north of Aceh by Exxon 
Mobil Company triggered a negative reaction in Aceh because all of the wealth that 
resulted from the discovery of oil and natural was transferred to Jakarta by the Suharto 
regime. The establishment of the Lhokseumawe Industrial Development Zone in 1977 
drew the arrival of non-Acehnese workers, and at the same time increased the presence of 
armed forces to secure the national asset. The provincial government had no right to tax 
the oil and gas revenues, and as a result the provincial budget only received a small  
amount of the total revenue. Ridiculously, most of the Acehnese still worked in the 
agricultural sectors and fisheries, as they lacked the education and required skills for 
getting jobs in the modern industrial compound.  
In the late 1970s, the Free Aceh Movement or “Gerakan Aceh Merdeka” (GAM) 
was formed under the leadership of Hasan di Tiro, a son of Tengku Cik di Tiro, who was 
a relative of the former sultan. The GAM began to oppose and challenge the Indonesian 
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regimes through decades of violent conflicts. Primarily, GAM was linked to the Darul 
Islam rebellion, but later GAM took opposition in the form of an ethno-nationalist 
movement. The government then launched a military operation to suppress the resistance 
and to maintain national integrity. The rebellion lacked the capability to challenge the 
government’s military forces, ultimately leading to the defeat of the rebellion because 
they failed to gain popular support from those Acehnese without religious motivation. 
Unable to defend the movement against the heavy military crush, Hasan di Tiro left Aceh 
in 1979 but continued his struggle and established a government in exile in Sweden. 
A decade after the first rebellion, the second GAM reemerged in 1989 with 750 
active members, and some 250 who had received military training in Libya (Ross, 2005, 
p. 42) and also better equipment captured from security forces. The suppression of the 
government quickly created a new generation of GAM from the family’s victims (Ross, 
2005, p. 73). In 1990, the military again responded with a heavy-hand. Many of GAM’s 
military commanders were captured or killed. The government’s action was successful in 
that short period of time. By 1991, GAM was considered as having been defeated by the 
military. According to Human Right Watch (HRW, 2001, p. 8), in late 1998, 871 people 
were killed by the army, 387 were missing who were later presumed dead. More than 500 
were listed under the status of “disappeared” and were never found. Tens of thousands of 
Acehnese were imprisoned and tortured in military camps. In addition, hundreds of rape 
cases and various human rights violations were reported. 
In 1989, Vice President Habibie became the successor of Suharto and transformed 
the authoritarian regime into a democracy. Habibie offered an option to the Timorese to 
choose between integration into and separation from the state. Ultimately, the Timorese 
managed to gain total separation from Indonesia in 1999. Then many student groups in 
Aceh demonstrated seeking a similar referendum.  According to Aquino, Putrato, and 
Rodthong (2009), the number of GAM fighters increased dramatically to some three 
thousand fighters with numerous assault rifles and grenade launchers, and controlled 
about 80 percent of Aceh’s villages. 
In July 2001, Megawati Sukarnoputri became the President. She encouraged a 
strong policy, but the military could not defeat the GAM strongholds in some villages. 
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Eventually, East Timor separated from Indonesia on May 20, 2002, creating massive 
demonstrations across Aceh; according to some estimation, more than 500,000 Acehnese 
gathered in the capital city of Banda Aceh to support the referendum. As a result, on 
December 9, 2002, GAM agreed to enter into a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement 
(COHA) with the government. The agreement later failed because both sides did not 
really trust each other, which ultimately lead to the collapse of the agreement in May 
2003 (Shulze, 2003, p. 265). 
On October 20, 2004, Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was elected President. 
One of his campaign platforms for the election was to promote peace in Aceh. 
Unpredictably, a rare tsunami disaster crashed into the west coast of Aceh on December 
26, 2004, causing 200,000 Acehnese, out of a the total population of four million, to 
perish in the wave. The Acehnese had an immediate need for both reconstruction and 
donations to ease their extreme suffering. Key players of the conflict were faced with a 
great pressure to respond reasonably. As a consequence, on August 15, 2005, in Helsinki, 
Finland, the government of Indonesia and GAM representatives took a constructive 
initiative to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) again, bringing an end to 
nearly three decades of armed conflict in Aceh. As a matter of fact, the two sides agreed 
to share 70 percent of the provincial benefit with Aceh, the remaining 30 percent with the 
central government. The MOU also required that the governor of Aceh result from an 
election. Finally, in mid-2006, Erwandi Eusuf, one of the GAM leaders, was elected 














Figure 6.   The Rise and Fall of GAM (From: Aquino, Putrato, & Rodthong, 2009) 
The success of GAM consisted of many factors. First, it was the right decision of 
Hasan di Tiro to change the religious movement to an ethno-nationalist movement. The 
Achenese had, for a long time, all shared in the repression and grievances stemming from 
the Dutch and Indonesian governments, so that GAM increased the level of control over 
the people while the government completely disregarded any effort to control the people 
through a proper campaign. Nonetheless, in the first and second GAM movements, the 
GAM did not have enough control of the people or enough popularity. Consequently, the 
government used force and barbarism against the guerrilla forces. It was the right strategy 
during that time according to the Diamond’s Strategy 3 and Arreguin-Toft’s hypotheses 
1, 4, and 5. On the contrary, in the third GAM movement, the GAM had sufficient 
popular support because the repression and grievances of the people had increased over 
time due to the growing socio-economic disparity in relation to what their condition 
should have been, had the Acehnese been in possession of their natural resources. 
Following that, the GAM had an opportunity and assistance with which to enlarge its 
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network and gain support among the countries helping it, including their its neighboring 
countries—such supports relevant to the Diamond’s Strategy 5. Furthermore, the 
government refrained from its tendency to engage in mass killings in East Timor’s case 
and also acceded to international pressure for the reconstruction, humanitarian and 
disaster relief following the Tsunami, all of which aided in advancing the Diamond’s 
Strategies 4 and 5 for the counter-state, while simultaneously making it worse for the 
state. After that, the government was willing to use the hot-hand again, but it was the 
wrong strategy at a time when the opponent was overwhelmingly successful in the use of 
the Diamond’s Strategies 1, 2, 4, and 5, all of which are also considered as indirect 
approaches by Arreguin-Toft. The government had no choice but to move to an indirect 
approach according to Arreguin-Toft’s hypothesis 5, where the strong actor is more likely 
to win same-approach interactions and lose opposite-approach interactions. Finally, the 
crisis ended. There were no more deaths and casualties, and the GAM terminated the long 
history of its armed struggle. In this case, the government did not win the war, but both 
sides won the conflict. 
E. EXPLANATION OF THE VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH OF THAILAND 
BY THE MODELS AND CASE STUDIES 
The first emergence of the insurgency was in the 1950s after the Assimilation 
Policy ignited the repression and flamed the grievances of the people. The government 
failed to use the Diamond’s Strategies 1 and 2 to control the people. The people suffered 
from the injustice of the central government and their needs were not responded to 
appropriately and adequately from the government.  Then several resistance groups were 
formed. However, these groups utilized guerrilla warfare and operated in the jungles and 
mountains.  Later, in the 1980s–1990s, CPM43 and SPBAC were established, and these 
organizations successfully accessed and pulled people back into the central society by 
providing the justice and trying to develop the southern provinces in all possible areas. . 
The next phase of operation during 1980s–1990s, the government subsequently used 
force, as indicated by the Diamond’s Strategy 3, against the guerrilla warfare. At the 
same time, the Diamond’s Strategies 4 and 5 were also applied.  Strategy 5 was 
implemented by asking for cooperation from Malaysian government. Once the Malaysian 
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government began cooperating with the Thai government, this cooperation essentially 
blocked any support from the Malaysian government to the insurgents.  In the first round, 
the insurgency was suppressed and consequently disappeared from the government’s 
sight, but the hidden activities for the next round were still ongoing. 
On January 4, 2004, the insurgency reemerged. This reemergence resulted from 
the government under Thaksin disestablishing some functional units in the south that had 
been successfully implemented the Diamond’s Strategies 1 and 2. At the same time, new 
policies that preferred the use of aggression were initiated and implemented by the 
Thaksin government prior the reemergence of the insurgency. While the Thaksin 
government had failed to apply Strategies 1 and 2, the invisible operations of the 
insurgency had been successful in advancing the Diamond’s Strategies 1, 2 and 5. The 
insurgency was secretly trained and funded by a rogue regime of both state and non-state 
actors. In this round of the Diamond Model, the insurgency first controls the people by 
ideology and belief, but later turns to the use of violence. Violent control implies not only 
threatening people, but also psychologically discrediting government security. In the Thai 
case, the government responded to the reemergence by reestablishing the CPM43 and the 
SBPAC, and setting up both an ad hoc Special Economic Development Zone (SEDZ) and 
the Justice Maintenance Center to improve upon the Diamond’s Strategies 1 and 2. In 
addition, the government initiated the Diamond’s Strategies 4 and 5 by arranging to 
broadcast a meeting with the other international actors to ensure an understanding of 
what the government was doing and how cruel the insurgency was. Task forces were also 
deployed in the three provinces and four districts of Sonkla provinces in order to enact 
the Diamond’s Strategy 3. is The intent was not only to use force against the insurgency, 
but to restore law and order by legitimacy, security measures, and Information Operation 
(IO).  
It is considered that in both rounds, the government followed Arreguin-Toft’s 
hypothesis 5: the strong force will win if both sides apply the same strategy. In the first 
phase, the government successfully applied an indirect approach against the insurgency’s 
indirect approach to control the people and to gain acceptance from the international 
community. Then the government used force against the force that had less support from 
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the other players. The government currently is doing the same thing in the new round of 
the counterinsurgency. It is estimated that a positive progression is recognized.  
F. APPLIED SCENARIOS FROM THE MODELS AND CASE STUDIES FOR 
STATE STRATEGIES  
 
Figure 7.   Chaiyo-Diamond model when Most of People Support for the Counter-State 
 
Figure 8.   Chaiyo-Diamond model when Most of People Support for the State  
As mentioned earlier in Chapter II, in 2004, His Majesty’s suggestion for the 
crisis in the south crisis is to understand, reach out, and develop. This suggestion 
emphasized that Strategies 1 and 2 be used to win the counter-state. Later, the Julanont 
government put forth strong effort to respond to His Majesty’s suggestion. 
Because of the emphasis placed on the actor, the people, in Strategies 1 and 2, by 
the Thai government and also because of the violent approach currently used mainly by 
the insurgents to discredit the central government and to discourage and intimidate the 
southern people from supporting the state, this author feel compelled to investigate in 
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depth the actor—that is, the people—in Strategies 1 and 2, while holding the actor in 
Strategies 4 and 5, the international community, as a constant.  
Holding this actor as a constant also makes it easier to assess the impact of the 
actor in Strategies 1 and 2 on the state and counter-state, while the state, in this case the 
Thai government currently emphasizes reducing the violent acts of the insurgents. 
Holding the international community actor as a constant is equivalent to assuming 
that the state is capable of maintaining its achievement over the Diamond’s Strategies 4 
and 5. Then, the remaining actors, people, state, and counter-state can be independently 
assessed and analyzed. The international community becomes statistically an independent 
variable from the other 3 actors. If it is possible to represent these variables in a statistical 
analysis, the covariance of the international community and any other variables becomes 
zero under this assumption. In other words, the above assumption allows that the 
assessment, analysis, and prediction of the people’s response to the state and counter-
state can be done independently. 
In a real situation, one actor or more could become a constant for many possible 
reasons. The following are some possible reasons. The state possesses a limited budget, 
manpower, and other resources with which to deal with all actors, thus making it 
compulsory for state to unequally weigh its dealings with each actor.  Currently, the Thai 
government is choosing to assign more weight to the people because of His Majesty’s 
suggestion as mentioned above. Either the state or counter-state or both, intentionally or 
unintentionally, ignore some actors because of a failure to see the significance of those 
actors or because the state or counter-state or both have already made a judgment that it is 
useless to deal with such actors. A good example of this is when a government has 
already been deemed unacceptable by international community because it is not an 
elected government. Multiple failures to deal with some actors could cause the 
disregarding of them because there is no point seen in wasting the resources to deal with 
them with no expectation of improvement. 
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The followings are assessments and analyses of a modified Diamond model, the 
Chaiyo-Diamond model, depicting three possible scenarios whereby the international 
community actor is held as a constant.    
Scenario 1, according to the Diamond’s Strategies 1 and 2, the state is restricted 
and prohibited from using a direct approach against people, no matter which people are 
close advocates of the state or the counter-state. The non-transparency, injustice, and the 
disparity of the state are considered as elements which will push people to join or assist 
the counter-state. Additionally, failure to apply the right approach can cause the utmost in 
terms of disaster to the state, as evidenced in several case studies, including the killing of 
East Timorese by the militia of Indonesia, an incident which caused external intervention, 
and the case of the October People of Thailand who embraced the ideology of the 
Communist Party after being crushed by state force. As a result, the state had to maintain 
merely an indirect approach toward the people.  
Scenario 2, when the counter-state accomplishes the Diamond’s Strategies 1 and 
2, apart from the Diamond’s Strategy 3, the government should apply an indirect strategy 
against the counter-state that will solicit support from the people, regardless of whether 
their initial motivation for supporting the counter-state is based in ideology, beliefs, fear, 
or resulting from grievances and negative opinions of the state. Granted, this scenario 
makes it difficult to distinguish the people from the insurgents, but the state should solely 
utilize an indirect approach to regain the people’s support, while proclaiming never to 
strike with force. Again, in this scenario, it is estimated that the counter-state successfully 
applies an indirect approach, and the state, according to Arreguin-Toft, then must utilize 
the same approach to win the war. 
Lastly, Scenario 3, the counter-state maintains its strategy of violence and fails at 
using psychological pressure, which in turn discredits the government security, and only 
controls people by cruelty, thus leading to less approval from the people. Finally, the 
counter-state could lose control of the people by adhering to the Diamond’s Strategies 1 




membership declining. This is the appropriate time for the state to use the Diamond’s 
Strategy 3, or a direct approach, to neutralize the riot, as well as to sustain the state’s use 
of the Diamond’s Strategies 1 and 2. 
From the case studies, in particular the Aceh conflict, when the resistance has less 
support from the population, the resistance has started to employ only direct force to the 
state in the form of guerrilla warfare. The state, in this case the Indonesian government, 
also used direct force to respond to the direct force of the resistance and the state defeated 
the resistance easily. This is the application at the right moment of scenario 3 discussed 
above by the Indonesian government. The victory of Indonesian government in an 
application of its direct force against the direct force of the resistance proved that the 5th 




V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The conflict in the southern provinces of Thailand has been ongoing since the 
kingdom of Thailand annexed its territory over Pattani and several resistance groups were 
formed. The Assimilation Policy of 1938 furthered the government’s repression--and 
fostered additional grievances from the local people—through sanctioned efforts to force 
the local people to accept the Thai identity. The southern people also perceived that they 
were left behind in terms of development and that they were treated unjustly. Since the 
government victoriously suppressed insurgents from 1989–1990s in the mountainous 
area, the rebels have now transformed themselves from guerrilla fighters into terrorist 
insurgents and have operated with dark village networks from January 4, 2004, until 
today. In this new round, the insurgency utilizes daily violence to control the people by 
fear and to psychologically discredit the security of the authority.  
Primarily, the Thaksin administration undertook the following actions: disbanding 
the cooperative organizations like SBPAC and CPM43, declaring martial law, fostering a 
climate in which the failures of human abuses in Kru Sae and Tak Bai occurred, 
introducing the zoning of red villages, and enacting the emergency decree. The aftermath 
of such a policy further alienated the local people and motivated them to participate with 
the counter-state. Covertly, the insurgency tried to implant irredentism and distort the 
principles of religion in order to pull more members in and to train the militants. After 
September 2006, Prime Minster Surayud Julanont manipulated a new mixed strategy of 
indirect and direct policies by reforming the ISOC4, the head unit of SBPAC, into a 
socio-economic wing, and CPM43 into a military wing. The setup of an ad hoc Special 
Economic Development Zone (SEDZ) was also intended to support economic 
development, along with the Justice Maintenance Center intended to examine injustice. 
Besides that, the Santisuk Force was established to build trust and confidence. Moreover, 
up to 66,000 troops were deployed to restore and enforce law and order, and to employ 
IO and PSYOP throughout villages. Consequently, the insurgency has lost its freedom of 
movement and its popular support is declining. No one will support gangsters who kill 
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everyone they meet. Accordingly, the insurgency has tried to target more Muslims who 
are accused of being betrayers of Islam by the insurgents. However, the more people who 
are killed and wounded, the less people will support the rebellion, the more information 
will be reported to the security force, and the more condemnation will be expressed by 
the international community. As a consequence, the administration estimates that the 
current membership of the extremists is down dramatically, following the people’s 
decision to lend their hands to the government’s efforts to develop their provinces  
From the models, case studies, and applied scenarios for the state, it can be 
determined that the state and the counter-state are both trying to gain an advantage over 
the other by controlling the people and gaining international support, while, at the same 
time, blocking the other side from doing so. If one side obtains more success in the 
Diamond’s Strategies 1, 2, 4, and 5, it will be easier to overcome the other side. In 
addition, if the strong actor applies the same approach as the weak actor, the stronger side 
will win the war.   
In the case of Thailand, in the first round of the insurgency’s emergence, the 
government was successful in their application of all the Diamond’s strategies, while the 
insurgency failed to do so. Yet, the insurgency did not give up its objective and covertly 
used the Diamond’s Strategies 1, 2, and 5. The underestimation and lack of control of the 
people by the government caused the insurgency to rise again in the latest round. The 
government tried to respond by reestablishing the previously successful strategies. The 
use of violence by the insurgency to control the people made it disadvantageous for the 
insurgents this time. It is considered that in both rounds, the government not only 
followed all the Diamond Model’s strategies, but also the Arreguin-Toft’s Model, 
especially its hypothesis 5: the strong force will win if both sides apply the same strategy. 
In the first phase, the government successfully applied an indirect approach against the 
insurgency’s indirect approach to control the people and to gain acceptance from the 
international community. Then, the government used force against the force, while the 
insurgents received less support from the other actors. Nonetheless, the crisis in the south 
is not at an end. The number of incidents is declining but still fluctuating. The insurgency 
can improve the efficiency of its application of the Diamond’s strategy, particularly its 
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efforts to control the people and ask for more international support, or it can move to a 
different approach suggested by Arreguin-Toft’s Model, which will affect the 
government’s next approach.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The crisis in the south of Thailand is estimated to be better in terms of the number 
of violent incidents. The government is probably on the right track for the time being, but 
the situation can change at anytime, especially if the insurgency develops more effective 
strategies to control the people and gain more external support, or if the insurgency 
adopts a new strategic approach that is different from the government’s. Therefore, it is 
highly recommended that the government maintain both direct and indirect strategies as 
outlined below. 
1. Indirect Approach is Solely Applied to the Population at All Times 
The government needs to sustain an indirect approach with the population, 
regardless of whether the majority of the people are with the government or the 
insurgency. The inefficacy of government, the injustice and inequality in applying laws, 
the sub-development of socio-economic support and welfare for the people, and an 
inadequacy of information operations and psychological operations can also push people 
to assist the insurgency.  Accordingly, more subordinated programs are strongly advised 
as stated below: 
 The government should enhance more educational programs and 
cooperation between Islamic schools and government schools. 
 The government should campaign for more motivation for ethical officials 
to work in the south provinces, as well as for local personnel to go back to 
work in their hometowns. 
 The government should frequently host public hearings to know what the 
people want from the government. 
 The government should promote research and development programs in 
the area by subsidizing more budgets and scholars.  
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 The government should appoint a councilor (Chularatchamontri) in 
Bangkok from the other parts of the country, not only from the central 
part. 
 The government should encourage officials who come from other parts of 
the country to study the southern culture, identity, Islamic teachings, and 
particularly the local language. 
 The government should gently inform the locals of the civic necessity to 
realize and pay respect to the official law and order in accordance with the 
other parts of the country, and not to rely solely on Islamic law. 
 The government needs to improve the medical and health care programs 
and medical resources for the locals. This type of policy is one of the best 
instruments for restoring the people’s support and royalty.  
 The government needs to reorganize and unite the cooperation of many 
official agencies in the area since they do not work in concert. 
 The government needs to publicly inform all programs of what exactly the 
government has done and their on-going projects, as well as to arrange a 
meeting with the media to discuss the media’s possible refrain from 
publishing the worst exaggerated violence in a given situation. 
 The government needs to reform all of its agencies and systems to comply 
with the principles of good governance with great accountability and 
transparency, which is one of the best preventive measures with which to 
impress the people and to keep them from going underground. 
 Official practitioners have to think globally but act locally, since good 
strategies often fail in the hands of the local authorities because they do 
not understand the bigger picture. 
2. Continue Indirect Approach with International Actors at All Times 
The external support form the international players is one of the key factors to 
countering the insurgency. The government has to be perceived as righteous, while  
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sustaining the collaboration with other states and non-state actors, including the 
neighboring countries in terms of information, counter measures, and other support.  
Moreover: 
 The government has to maintain a high degree of cooperation with the 
other countries not supporting the insurgency.  
 The government needs to share terrorist information and counter measures 
with the other international agencies and committees. 
 The government needs to publicly inform the people and the international 
community of the brutality of the insurgents.  
 The government has to increase the cooperation from Malaysian 
government, restrictively seal the border, continue the joint border patrols, 
and allow for dual nationalities, but those people possessing dual 
citizenships must openly declare their dual citizenship status by registering 
with the appropriate government official.   
3. Indirect Approach Is to Be Applied When Most of the People Support 
the Insurgency  
When most of the people are controlled by the insurgency, especially by its 
ideologies or beliefs, and the government is unsuccessful in controlling them, it is 
difficult to separate and distinguish the people from the insurgency. The government then 
needs to not only put more effort in to manipulating the same strategy and tactics as noted 
in Recommendation 1, but also to redirect the distorted ideologies in order to regain the 
people’s support. The direct strike application of force is very restricted in this situation. 
The regime also needs to enhance the following projects:  
 The government needs to improve intelligence to dismantle and disrupt 
the dark networks and the movement of resources for the insurgency.  
 The government needs to control and revise the laws regarding money 
laundering for charity, as well as the donations from those countries that 
support the insurgency in the south, because the insurgents depend heavily 
on those sources of financial support.  
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 Reconciliation and amnesty programs have to be maintained for insurgents 
and partisans who are arrested, allowing them to return to their normal 
lives.  
 The government needs to negotiate and reconcile the requirements of the 
insurgency.  
4. Direct Approach Is to Be Applied When Most of the People Support 
the Government 
When the government gains support from majority of the people, especially by 
implementing those subordinated programs advised under the recommendation 1, it is 
then a suitable time to suppress the insurgency by force.  
 The legitimate use of force by in accordance with the rules of engagement 
needs to be recognized. 
 The best outcome is one that results in the fewest deaths and injuries. The 
official troops should not have to bear an image of cruelty. 
 It will be most beneficial for the government to try to convert insurgents 
into normal people with positive opinions. 
As a matter of fact, popular support is needed both for the success of the 
insurgency and the government. But support is difficult to measure.  Additionally, from 
the study, force is still essential to sustain security and crush the rebellion when it is 
needed. Force can be applied within the other indirect approaches as well. As a 
consequence, it would be beneficial to conduct research on the measurement of support 
by the people for the insurgency or the government, as well as research on the appropriate 
number of the troops and how to deploy them, or the density of the troops in a 
counterinsurgency mission. All of these would be very interesting follow-ups to this 
study.  
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APPENDIX. PATTANI HISTORY SEQUENCED BY TIME AND 
ADDITIONAL QUANTITATIVE ACCOUNT OF VIOLENCE 
A. CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATION OF PATTANI BACKGROUND 
The kingdom of Pattani experienced a long history, as Klaimanee (2008, pp. 15–
24) chronologically noted:  
 In the 7th century, the three southern provinces of Thailand were called 
the “Lankasuka Empire” and influenced by Hinduism. People lived their 
lives by fishing and agriculture. 
 In the 9th–13th centuries, the Buddhism Empire of Srivichai, whose center 
was on Sumatra Island of the present Indonesia, expanded its power over 
the area of southern Indo-China including Lankasuka. At that time, the 
Lankasuka inhabitants changed their belief to Buddhism, and the 
prosperity of the trading sea ports were well known by the regional 
empires: China, India, and Arab.  
 In the 13th century, the first kingdom of Thailand, named “Sukhothai,” 
was established and was growing. 
 In the 13th–14th centuries, Islam was brought to Lankasuka, which was 
subsequently renamed as the Pattani Kingdom.  
 In the 15th century, most of the Pattani people changed their religion from 
Buddhism to Islam.  
 In the 16th–17th centuries, Pattani, Kelantan, Terengganu, Peris, Kedah, 
Laos, and Khmer (Cambodia) were dominated by Siam.  
 In the mid 18th century, Ayuthaya lost the war to Myanmar. Then, Laos, 
Khmer, and Pattani separated from Ayuthaya.  
 In 1782, King Rama I of Bangkok reestablished Thailand. The King had 
spread his power over the region again, including Pattani and the whole 
Malaya continent. At that time, Siam assigned Tengku, or Sulatan of 
Pattani, to rule his kingdom under the power of Siam; but later the Sulatan 
tried to rebel against Siam. 
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 In the 19th–20th centuries, most of Southeast Asian nations except 
Thailand were colonized by the super power of Europe; as noted, France 
colonized Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; England colonized Burma and 
Malaya, including Peris, Kedah, and Terengganu from Siam; Indonesia 
was colonized by the Netherlands and Portugal (Berger, 2004, pp. 88–89).  
 In 1896, King Rama V organized Pattani into Nakhon Si Thammarat 
Circle, and the Sulatan of Pattani tried to oppose that again and was 
arrested. The Pattani Kingdom ended.  
 In 1932, the Circle Administration of Thailand was changed to Provinces 
including Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. 
 In 1938, the government proclaimed an “Assimilation Policy” to unite all 
the Thai people, including Thai Muslims, in terms of Thai culture and 
identity. For example, the southern Muslims had to speak Thai, dress in 
Thai style, with no Islamic law or Islamic court. This rule had a severely 
negative impact on the people of the southern province.  
 In 1947, Haji Sulong Tohmeena, one of the Muslim leaders, sent a written 
request to the government for the “Pattani Ideology Association,” or “the 
Autonomous Provinces” that raised several demands that included: (1) the 
authority to govern themselves; (2) that 80 percent of the official 
personnel were to be Muslims; (3) that Jawi would the second official 
language together with Thai;(4) that additional Islamic schools would be 
built; (5) Islamic laws and courts were to be accepted; and (6) the benefit 
of all business of the four provinces (including Satun province) were to be 
used within their area.  
 In April, 1948, there was a clash between the police and local Muslims.  
As a result, 1,100 Muslims and 30 policemen died in Dusun Nyiur, 
Narathiwat. 
 In 1949, Haji Sulong Tohmeena was arrested.  
 In 1952, Haji Sulong was released and disappeared, but it was believed 
that he maintained his resistance in the north of Malaysia.  
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B. ADDITIONAL QUANTITATIVE ACCOUNT OF VIOLENCE 
As previously mentioned, the leaders of the extremists never intended to negotiate 
directly with the government. The counter-state needs to be invisible and just to pressure 
the state by terror actions in order to psychologically overcome the state’s hold over the 
people. As a matter of fact, the ways that the insurgents communicate with the 
government is through the number of incidents in a period of time, the number deaths, 
injuries, the kinds of targets and victims. Those sorts of things will more or less 
demonstrate what they are thinking.  
1. Total Number of Incidents in Each Year (January 2004–June 2008) 






January-June 2008 355 
Total 8,171 
Table 3.   The Number of Incidents in Each Year from January 2004–June 2008  
(From: Violence-related Injury Surveillance, 2009) 
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Figure 9.   The Kinds of Victims (January 2004–June 2008)  
(From: Violence-related Injury Surveillance, 2009) 
From January 2004 to June 2008, the largest number of victims involved the 
normal people or civilians, equaling 63 percent. The next largest targets were 12 percent 
military; ten percent police; four percent other official personnel; four percent 
government and non-government workers; four percent village guards; and three percent 
village chiefs, respectively. As a consequence, it is shown that the insurgents wanted to 
create fear and hatred among the people and officials, and to demonstrate psychologically 
the lack of an effective security measures on the part of the government. Meanwhile, in 
many cases, it is difficult to distinguish whether an incident was a normal crime or an 
incident created by the insurgency because the area in question is also chaotic with crime, 
drug trafficking, illegal business, and local political competition that sometimes use 




was responsible for the incidents, because the insurgents are also disguised as normal 
people or, as some people call them, “five minute bandits” or “friend by day, enemy by 
night.” 
3. Number of Deaths and Casualties (January 2004–June 2008) 
 
Figure 10.   The Number of Deaths and Casualties (January 2004-June 2008) (From: 
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Figure 11.   The Number of Deaths (January 2004–June 2008)  
(From: Violence-related Injury Surveillance, 2009) 
From January 2004 to June 2007, the incidents fluctuated but trended upward 
until the government conducted an offensive operation in June 2007 that caused a 
decrease in the number of incidents. However, the number of deaths and casualties still 
fluctuated and did not trend downward compared to the previous months before the crack 
down policy. The decrease in incidents is not varied directly in relation to the deaths and 
casualties. On the other hand, it was noticed that the insurgency tried to escalate the 
incidents into ones of greater cruelty in order to maintain the fear of the people and to 
discredit the security efforts of the government. Moreover, it appears that when the 
insurgents were pressured by force intervention and limited in their freedom of 
movement, they resorted to the incidents of more violence to illustrate that they existed 
and to counter the tactics of the state’s use of force.  
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4. The Dead and Injured Victims by Religion (January 2004–June 2008) 
 
Figure 12.   The Dead and Injured Victims by Religions (January 2004–June 2008)  
(From: Violence-related Injury Surveillance, 2009)  
In the beginning, the targets were focused on the symbols of the Thai government 
and Thai identity, which included Buddhist civilians, Buddhist monks, government 
teachers and schools, and the military and police. After that initial targeting, the 
subsequent targets became random to any local region including Muslims themselves. 
From January 2004 to December 2008, the total number of dead and injured Buddhists 
were 4,279 (53 percent), and the total number of dead and injured Muslims were 3,185 
(39.5 percent) from a total of 8,057 cases. Nonetheless, the number of Muslim deaths was 
4,512 (56 percent), which is greater than the 3,383 deaths of Buddhists (42 percent).  
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5. Buddhist and Muslim Victims (2004–July 2009) 
 
Figure 13.   The Injured Victims by Religion, Gender, and Age from January 2007–July 2009  
(From: Violence-related Injury Surveillance, 2009) 
From January 2007–July 2009, the number of female victims (left hand) was far 
less than that of male victims. The ages of the victims were mostly from 20 to 49. There 
is no significant difference in the numbers of Buddhist victims (dark color) and Muslim 
victims (white color). Some victims were of unidentified religion (light color).  
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Figure 14.   The Injured Victims by Religion, Gender, and Month, from January 2007–July 
2009 (From: Violence-related Injury Surveillance, 2009) 
For the choosing of victims, the insurgency first selected symbolic targets of Thai 
identity and Buddhism, such as the government schools, teachers, and Buddhist monks. 
After that, the insurgency struck all types of victims, mostly soft targets including 
Muslims, and then took turns targeting the military, police, and other officials. It was 
unexpected that the number of deaths of Muslim victims was actually greater than that of 
Buddhist victims in the last couple of years. It is estimated that the cooperation of the 
people increased because the government initiated a greater variety of development 
projects and information operations. The southernmost people are obviously recognized 
by the government, but not so for a small group of rebels who are starving for 
independence. However, after the offensive operation in June 2007 (red circle), there was 
no significant difference in the number of Buddhist victims and Muslims victims. 
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